and comparison schools, panel data on schools are used to estimate school fixed-effect models.
The data used in the study include characteristics and scholastic achievements of all high school graduates in Israel in 1993-97. The data are a panel at the school level. The teachers' monetary incentives are a function of the achievements of students in their final year of high school and of the dropout rate at all high school grades. Panel data on students were used in order to determine the dropout rate at each grade.
The paper is organized as follows. Following a description of the two programs and the Israeli high school scholastic achievement data (Sec. II), Section III presents a simple graphical presentation of the identification strategy of the incentive program. Section IV describes the statistical model used for inference for both programs. Section V presents the main results for the two intervention strategies, and Section VI presents a cost-benefit comparison of the two policy alternatives. Section VII presents conclusions.
The results suggest that teachers' monetary incentives had some effect in the first year of implementation (mainly in religious schools), and they caused significant gains in many dimensions of students' outcomes in the second year (in religious and secular schools alike). For example, the program led to an increase in average test scores and in the number of credit units (including science subjects) of high school graduates. The evidence also suggests that the bonus intervention resulted in a higher proportion of students who gained the matriculation certificate (especially among those from a disadvantaged background) and also to a reduction in the dropout rate in the transition from middle to high school. The results regarding the second program-endowing schools with more conventional resources such as additional teaching time and on-the-job teacher training-suggest that it also led to significant improvement in student performance. However, the comparison of the programs based on cost equivalency suggests that the teachers' incentive intervention is much more cost effective.
I. The Interventions and the Data
The two interventions were designed to improve the performance of high school graduates in their matriculation exams and to reduce dropout rates at different grades in high school.5 The postprimary state school system in Israel has two types of secondary schools: the first, called "secondary comprehensive" schools, includes both the middle and high school grades (grades 7-12); the second includes only high 5 The matriculation certificate is similar to the Baccalaureate in France and to the "Certificate of Maturity" (Reifezeugnis) in Germany.
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JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY school grades (10-12). About 65 percent of all high school students are enrolled in secondary comprehensive schools. The incentives project was targeted exclusively to these secondary comprehensive schools, whereas the resources project included both types of school.
Toward the end of the last year of high school, students sit for exams in various subjects, some compulsory and some elective. In the eleventh grade, students choose one of three levels of difficulty of study in each subject, each awarding a different number of credit units: three, four, and five. Choosing level four or five (credit units) in a given subject earns a bonus of 12.5 percent or 25 percent, respectively, in the test score of the matriculation exam in that subject. A minimum of 20 credit units is required to qualify for a matriculation certificate, which is a necessary though not sufficient requirement for admission to a university. About 42 percent of all 1997 high school graduates received a matriculation certificate.
A. The Teachers' Incentive Intervention
In February 1995, Israel's Ministry of Education announced a new experimental competition that would reward teachers and schools with monetary bonuses based on their students' performance (details are provided in Ministry of Education [1995] ). The objectives of the program were to reduce dropout rates in secondary schools and improve scholastic achievements. The three performance measures specified included the average number of credit units per student, the proportion of students receiving a matriculation certificate, and the school dropout rate.6 Sixty-two schools were selected for the program, with a few more added later. The conditions for selection were that the school should be the only one of its kind in its community and that it be a secondary comprehensive school. Participating schools competed for a total of about $1.44 million in awards in 1996. School performance was measured in two stages. First, school average outcomes (the three performance measures specified in the previous paragraph) were normalized (for the year of treatment and the previous year) relative to an expected base predicted from regressions (estimated separately for each year and outcome) that controlled for the socioeconomic background of the student body.7 Second, schools were then ranked each year according to their improvement (absolute value added between years t and t-1) in the various performance measures.8 Only the top third performers gained awards. The distribution of cash incentives among award-winning schools was determined only according to their ranking in terms of relative improvement (in 1996 the highest scoring school won $105,000, and the lowest award was $13,250). Seventy-five percent of the award was distributed among the teachers (proportionally to their gross income) as a salary bonus; the remainder was used to improve all faculty facilities, such as teachers' common rooms. In 1996 the highest bonus per teacher was about $1,000 and the lowest $250 (the average annual starting salary of a high school teacher is $20,000; the mean is $30,000). Although the program was announced only in the spring of 1995, teachers received awards for the 1994/95 school year, mainly in order to enhance the credibility of the program and draw teachers' attention to the program.
The intervention evaluated here is a group incentive program, where the combined performance of a group determines the total incentive payment, which is divided among individuals regardless of individual performance. The economic literature compares group incentives to individual incentives and discusses factors such as the difficulty of measuring individuals' contribution and effort, free-rider problems, the often-multifaceted nature of individuals' effort in a firm, and moral hazard and strategic behavior issues (e.g., Gaynor 
B. The "School Resources" Program
Another new experimental project initiated in 1994 was based on endowing schools with additional teaching time and teachers' on-the-job training. This project had the same objectives as the incentive project. Schools enjoyed complete freedom in designing their intervention. About 75 secondary schools applied to participate in this program. Each applicant submitted a proposal detailing the specific uses to which the additional resources would be put. A ministerial steering committee reviewed and ranked the applicants, finally selecting 25 schools, al-7 School averages of all three performance measures were based on the size of the graduating cohort while in ninth grade and not in twelfth grade. This procedure was adopted in order to discourage schools from "gaming" the incentive system, e.g., by encouraging the transfer or dropout of poor students or by placing poor students in the nonmatriculation track.
8 To encourage schools to direct more effort toward weak students, only the first 20 credit units of each student were counted in computing the school mean, which was then used to rank the school in the bonus program.
TEACHERS' PERFORMANCE
1291
though only 22 schools ultimately participated in the program. Schools used the additional resources to add teaching time, to split classes into smaller study groups, and to provide extra coaching for weak students. Each school received a voucher of teachers' time equivalent to 2.5 additional full-time teachers, about 3 percent of the mean number of teachers per school in Israel. The total annual cost of the program was about $1.2 million.
C. The Data
The data pertain to the three years preceding the two programs, 1993-95, and to the two full years of implementation, 1996 and 1997. The micro student files included information on achievement measures and student characteristics (gender, parental schooling, family size, and immigration status). The school data file included information on schools (size, number of teachers, and boarding school facilities) and teachers' characteristics (age, experience, and education) in the last year of both programs (1997). School identification numbers were used to match and merge school files with student files. The incentives program included 37 secular Hebrew schools, 18 religious Hebrew schools, and seven Arab schools. The resources program included 13 secular Hebrew schools, four religious Hebrew schools, and five Arab schools. There are about 320 high schools in Israel, of which 170 are comprehensive high schools.
III. A Graphical Presentation of the Identification Strategy
Columns 1 and 4 of panel A of table 1 present the mean of achievement measures and students' and school characteristics of the treated and nontreated secular Hebrew secondary comprehensive schools in Israel. Clearly, the two samples differ considerably in all dimensions of outcomes and characteristics. For example, the mean average score in the treated schools (row 3) is 73, and in all other schools it is over 78. The t-test for the equality of means is 14.5 (col. 5), indicating that they are different at a conventional level of significance. Large and significant differences are also evident in student and school characteristics. For example, in treated schools the students come from a lower socioeconomic background. It is possible that the two groups differ in other, unmeasured, dimensions that render the comparison of the two groups useless for evaluation.
However, there might be a subgroup of schools that could be an appropriate comparison group for identifying the effect of the intervention. The selection rules for the project with teachers' performance incentives suggest a natural way to select such a comparison group. Two rules were used to select participants: First, the school must be the only one of its kind in the community. Four types of schools were considered: secular Jewish secondary schools, boys' and girls' religious Jewish secondary schools, and Arab secondary schools. The distribution of the number of schools in the community of each of these four types of schools was used to select potential schools for treatment, namely, those of which there is only one in the community. The second rule, that the school must be a comprehensive secondary school, was then applied to the potential list of schools. Therefore, a school was selected for the program if it was a secondary comprehensive school and the only one of its kind in its community, but not if it was one of two or more schools of its kind in the community.
It is useful to present the rationale of this identification strategy graphically. Figure 1 presents the 1994 preprogram averages of all achievement measures for the distribution of schools by the number of schools in the community (for all Jewish secular schools). The horizontal axis measures the number of schools in the community, starting from one school in the community, then two, and then averages for the following groups: three to four, five to six, seven to eight, nine to 10, and more than 11 schools in the community.
All the figures show that the mean achievement increases with the number of schools in the community. This trend probably reflects the correlation between the size of the locality and variables that affect school quality, such as family and community wealth or parental education, as well as the effect of the level of competition among schools on school quality. We also observe in all the figures that the mean achievements of the group with one school per community are higher than those of the group with two schools per community. However, when only secondary comprehensive schools are included (the second assignment rule for the program), the differences between them vanish almost completely. These results are seen in figure 1, where T denotes the treated schools and C denotes the comprehensive schools, which are part of the group with two schools per community.9
Column 2 of table 1 presents the means of the comprehensive schools that constitute the group with two schools per community, which should be compared with column 1. The t-tests of the means (col. 3) indicate that for all six achievement measures the differences between the means of the two groups are barely significantly different from zero even though the sample is very large. This stands in sharp contrast to the ttest statistics for equality of means between the treated one-school group and all other nontreated schools (col. 5). The striking similarity between the two groups adjacent to the cutoff point suggests that it is appropriate to choose the group with two secondary comprehensive schools per community as a comparison group for identification. This identification strategy can be viewed as a natural experiment or as an example of treatment determined by a known discontinuous function of an observed covariate (the number of schools in the community). Campbell (1969) was the first to consider the latter strategy, denoting it as a regression discontinuity design. Angrist and Lavy (1999) formulated the regression discontinuity design in terms of an instrumental variable estimation, an approach also applied in Lavy (2001) and, in a different version, by Van der Klaauw (1996). In the current application there is only one point of discontinuity, or only one threshold value: the one between belonging to the group with one or two schools per community. Therefore, it is appropriate and sufficient to use only the discontinuity sample, namely those schools that are nearest to the threshold or the point of discontinuity, without having to extrapolate and use the whole distribution of schools.
I noted earlier that using the 1993 instead of the 1994 data leaves these results unchanged. The stability of the pattern in both pretreatment years may be an indication that these similarities are permanent, enhancing the credibility of the identification model. These similarities can also be viewed as a reasonable justification for the differences-indifferences estimation method, to which I turn next.
A.
Differences-in-Differences Estimates
The contrast between the treated and the comparison schools can yield differences-in-differences (DID) estimates of the effect of the teachers' incentive program (secular schools) on the various measures of achievement. For example, the 1994 averages of the treatment and comparison groups can be compared with the postprogram averages of the two groups. Contrasting the 1996 with the 1994 means for the sampleJewish secular schools yields DID estimates that are practically zero for most achievement measures. The 1997 DID estimates are positive for all achievement measures except the proportion of pupils who earned matriculation certificates (unconditional on the proportion of students who took the exam). For example, the change in the mean number of credit units is one for the treated and 0.6 for the control schools. The difference between these two changes is 0.4 unit. The mean change in the average matriculation score is about one point for treated schools and 0.05 point for control schools; the DID estimate is 0.95 point. The DID estimate for units of science credits is 0.15, for the proportion of pupils taking matriculation exams 6 percent, and for the dropout rate -3 percent. However, all these estimates are not precise. Furthermore, since the means compared pertain to different cohorts of students, the change estimated may merely reflect student compositional change. Section IV presents the methodology that allows us to study the DID estimates net of potential compositional change and of the effect of unobserved school heterogeneity, using a panel of micro student-level data.
B. Treated Hebrew Religious Schools
The sample of treated Hebrew religious schools belongs to the group with one school per community; however, the data include many other schools that belong to the same category but were not included in the incentives program (14 Hebrew religious schools). While Ministry of Education officials argue that all the schools that satisfied this condition in 1995 were included in the program, it could very well be that the Ministry failed to classify these other schools properly as belonging to the category with one school per community. This bureaucratic error raises the possibility that the group of "misclassified' schools is a natural comparison group for the identification of the treatment effect of the teachers' performance incentives in Hebrew religious schools.
Panel B of table 1 presents the means for the religious schools. Column 1 presents the means for the treated schools. Column 2 presents the means for the untreated comprehensive schools forming the group with one school per community; it should be compared with column 1. The means in column 2 are much more similar to those in column 1 than the means in column 4, suggesting that the untreated secondary comprehensive schools in the group with one school per community are more appropriate as a comparison group for identification. The DID estimates for the sample religious schools are positive for all the 1997 achievement measures and for some of those for 1996.
IV. Measurement Framework
The DID estimates presented in Section III suggest a clear and positive relationship between the exposure of teachers to performance incentives and postprogram students' achievement in the second year of the program. On the basis of the very similar means of the pretreatment achievement measures and characteristics, the maintained assumption was that the two groups of schools are identical in all pretreatment measures. However, since pre-and posttreatment school-level panel data are available, I can extend the simple model to include school fixed effects that will account for any remaining permanent differences, observed and unobserved, between the two groups.
This extension is simply an application of a model used in numerous 
where est is a time-varying error term and ,s is a school-specific intercept. The term eis can be correlated with 45, but it is assumed to be independent of the treatment status Dist. The term at is a period effect common to all pupils and schools. Thus, while pupils in the treated schools may still have higher or lower pretreatment achievement measures than pupils in the control schools, this difference is assumed to stem from 
where est is the error term, assumed to be uncorrelated with Dist. Note that Di, in equation (2) is an interaction term equal to the product of a dummy indicating observations after 1994 and a dummy indicating treated schools. In this model, simple posttreatment comparisons of test scores by treatment status may not estimate the causal effect of treatment because the time-invariant characteristics of schools in the treatment and control groups might differ. However, we can use the panel data to estimate 4k and obtain a consistent estimate of the program effect. This estimate is basically the DID estimator computed in a regression of stacked students (micro data) for schools and years, when a vector of students' characteristics is added to the regression.'? The evidence in table 1 indicates that there are still some differences between pupils in the two groups. The model above controls for these pretreatment differences by assuming that they are fixed at the school level and subtracts them from the posttreatment difference in scores. This assumption seems appropriate given the stability of the differences as seen in the two years prior to treatment. However, instead of relying solely on this model, we can use a matching strategy to nonparametrically control for any remaining average pretreatment achievement differences (see, e.g., Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd 1997). The matching can be based on propensity score analysis (see, e.g., Dehejia and Wahba 1998) or on school characteristics (see, e.g., Angrist 1998; Angrist and Lavy 2001). In this paper, since the number of schools in each group is small, the matching is accomplished by limiting the sample to treatment and control schools in which the 1994 school-level average proportions of pupils who received the matriculation certificate are similar. This is useful if there is something special about the treatment schools ("random school effects") that cannot be captured by the natural experiment design and the estimated school fixed effects.
The school fixed-effect models assume that the differences between treatment and control schools are permanent. If some of the differences are temporary, owing to transitory shocks, the fixed-effect estimates will be biased. Two comments should be made in this regard. First, we have seen that the similarities between treatment and control schools hold for each of the two years prior to treatment, 1993 and 1994. Second, the effect of the two programs is evaluated over two or three years of implementation, which reduces the possibility of a "regression to the mean" effect.
How should the estimate of a in equation (2) TEACHERS' PERFORMANCE that schools were treated on unobserved propensity to respond to the intervention. However, we cannot exclude the possibility that schools with a monopoly prior to the intervention are more likely to respond to incentives, perhaps because a lack of local competition implied lower teacher motivation ex ante. Such concerns may be more relevant in the sample of religious schools, where the control schools had systematically better pretreatment performance; this raises the possibility that the "bureaucratic error" used for identification was not completely random. For example, the treated schools might be more "problem schools." Such schools might conceivably have more ability to "cream-skim" potential improvements and show a quicker, stronger, positive response to treatment. Conversely, such schools might have systematic problems that make it harder for them to show a quick or positive response to treatment. The information needed to refute these possibilities is not available. Therefore, the results to be presented below can be appropriately interpreted as treatment effect on the treated, which tells us whether, on average, students in schools who participated in the program benefited from it.12
Identifying the Effect of School Resources
Evaluating the effect of the school resources program is based on using as a comparison group applicants that were not admitted to the project. Such a comparison controls for differences between participating and nonparticipating schools that originate in the decision to apply to the program, but does not control for most of the criteria used by the authorities when choosing which of the applicant schools to accept. As shown in Section V, the applicants are much more similar to the treated schools than to all the other schools, but there are still some remaining differences in measures of achievements and characteristics. Again, using the panel data on schools to estimate equation (2) will account for these and other (unobserved) differences, as long as they are permanent. Under the assumption that the treatment status among applicants can be ignored, conditional on the set of observed student covariates and the school fixed effects, this comparison will yield a consistent estimate of the program's effect on the treated students. A nonparametric school matching strategy can be used to achieve even better equivalency of the pretreatment observables between the two groups. As in the previous intervention, each of the treated schools is matched to an untreated applicant with the same 1994 proportion of pupils who received matriculation certificates. This matching controls for preprogram temporary shocks leading to transitory differences between schools that influenced participation in the project.'3
V. Empirical Results
A.
The Teachers' Incentives Intervention Table 2 14 Estimating the models using only the two years prior to treatment (1993-94) shows that the estimated coefficient of a dummy variable that identifies the schools that were included in the program is not different from zero. This means that the treated and control schools are well balanced on all outcomes, conditioned on students' characteristics. The estimated trends for all outcome measures are also identical for treatment and control schools: the estimated coefficients of the interaction between the year dummy and the treatment dummy were not different from zero. 15 The standard errors for the regression estimates reported in all the tables in the paper are corrected for school-level clustering using eq. (1) in Moulton (1986). The same model was estimated with a sample that included only the matched schools. As a result, only eight of the 37 secular treated schools (and all eight control schools) now appear in the analysis. The matched sample of religious schools includes 14 pairs of treated and control schools. Naturally, the two samples become even more similar in achievements and characteristics. The matching results (cols. 2, 4, 6, 8, An important question is which students benefited most from the program. A simple way to trace the composition of students who were affected by the program is to add to the model interaction terms of the treatment variable with the demographic variables. In all the models presented above, these variables (father's and mother's schooling and family size) had very large and significant effects on all the outcome measures. It is clear from these results that the low end of the distribution of students, in terms of outcomes, is characterized by a low level of parental schooling and a large family size.
The results in table 3 (for 1997) clearly suggest that the treatment effect in all five outcome measures declines with all three demographic variables, especially with mother's schooling. The coefficient on the interaction with mother's schooling is significantly different from zero in all five cases, in the secular and religious samples. Two important conclusions can be based on table 3. First, the teachers' incentives program affected mainly the weak students: at the sample mean of mother's schooling, the net program effect is almost zero. Second, the intervention led to a relatively large increase in the rate of students who achieved the matriculation certificate among students from a poor socioeconomic background, even though on average it had a relatively small effect on this rate. These results show that the strategic feature built into the program (see n. 8) indeed affected the behavior of the schools in the program. 
The Estimated Effects on Dropout Rates
The incentives program aimed at reducing dropout rates as well. The program focused relatively more on reducing the dropout rate in the transition from ninth to tenth grade. This transition involves the graduation from middle school and enrollment in an upper secondary school. However, I shall also report below results from estimating the program effect on the dropout rate from tenth or eleventh grade and from eleventh to twelfth grade.
I estimated probit models with school fixed effects, similar to the models discussed above. The dependent variable was an indicator of whether the pupil dropped out or continued schooling in any school in the country. Since data on ninth grade students are available only from 1994 on, all the models reported below are estimated using 1994 as the pretreatment base year. The mean dropout rate in 1996 in secular schools was 6.0 percent, and in 1997 it was 5.5 percent. The respective means in the sample of religious schools were 3.7 and 3.2 percent. Columns 1-4 of table 4 present the estimated effects of the incentive intervention on dropout rates at ninth grade. The effects are negative; are relatively precisely estimated, especially in the secular schools sample; and are larger in the second year of the program (1997) and when the matched samples are used.
Columns 5-8 present the estimated program effect on the continuation rate from tenth and eleventh grades. The probit regressions were estimated using a pooled sample of pupils from these two grades. The estimated effects are negative but are very imprecisely estimated, especially in the sample of religious schools. This evidence suggests that the program on dropout rates mainly affects the continuation rates from the last year of middle school (ninth grade) to the first year of high school (tenth).'6 I reported in the previous subsection that the program did not increase the mean matriculation passing rate among high school graduates. However, on the basis of the program effect on reducing the dropout rate from ninth to tenth grade, we can conclude that the program increased the mean number of students who gained the matriculation diploma, even though the mean rate of this outcome did not change very much.
Characterization of "Winning" Schools
Although the teachers' incentive program was introduced to teachers and principals in the treated schools only in middle of the 1994/95 school year, bonuses were given for this year as well, mainly in order to publicize the program and enhance its credibility. Eighteen schools received bonuses for this year (11 of the 37 participating secular schools and eight of the 19 participating religious schools). In the full two years of the project, 1995/96 and 1996/97, 13 and 17 secular schools received bonuses, respectively. The number of award-winning religious schools remained eight in both years.
Seventeen of the 56 participating Hebrew schools did not win an award in any of the three years. Nineteen schools won once, nine won twice, and eight won in all three years. Lazear and Rosen (1981) analyzed compensation schemes that pay according to an individual's ordinal rank in a tournament rather than his or her output level. In such a tournament model with symmetric information, risk neutrality, and equal abilities of individuals (schools), all individuals should make the same effort, and the outcome is a random event; namely, the probability of winning is equal to the proportion of schools that receive prizes. In our case, this proportion is one-third, and therefore the probability of winning twice in a row is .11. In the two years in which the intervention could have had a causal effect (1996 and 1997), 14 of the 53 Jewish schools that participated won twice. This proportion, .28, is much higher than the .11 predicted from the model above. These results suggest that there is something systematic and not random that generates the results. More information pointing to this same direction can be derived by comparing the proportion of schools that won in both 1995 (no intervention but prizes distributed) and 1996 (first year of treatment) with the proportion of schools winning in 1996 and 1997. I expect the proportion of winners in both 1995 and 1996 to be much smaller than the proportion of winners in both 1996 and 1997. When I focus only on the secular schools that had a relatively large sample of participants, four of the 36 schools (11 percent, as predicted by the model in Lazear and Rosen [1981] ) won in 1995 and 1996, and nine of the 36 schools (25 percent) won in both 1996 and 1997.
Comparison of award-winning schools in 1996 or in 1997 with the nonwinning schools in each of these years suggests that they do not differ in any of their pretreatment, 1993 or 1994, characteristics. The students' scholastic achievements in the two groups (winners and nonwinners) are about the same in 1993 and 1994. No differences in students', teachers', and school characteristics emerge from this comparison as well.
B. The School Resources Intervention
Owing to sample size limitation, the resources intervention is evaluated here only for the secularJewish schools. Table 5 presents the means of measures of achievement and characteristics of students and schools included in the treated schools (col. 1). Also included in the table is the same information for all other secular applicants to the program (col. 2) and a matched sample from this group (col. 4). Overall, students from nontreated applicant schools show higher achievements than students in treated schools. These differences, though significantly different from zero in most cases, are not very large in absolute terms. However, in order to eliminate these differences as well, a matched sample was chosen for comparison on the basis of the 1994 average of the proportion of pupils who received the matriculation certificate. As a result, the gaps between the means presented in columns 1 and 4 are smaller than those presented in columns 1 and 2, although some differences remain. Table 6 The "recommended sample" is derived from the rules used to select schools for the program. The applicant schools were screened, and a group of 32 schools out of the 70 applicants were recommended for a second review and final selection. These 32 schools presented their program to a committee that ranked them in terms of quality. This list of untreated recommended schools could be used as a control group instead of all the untreated applicants. The results in the third row of each panel of table 6 are obtained when the nontreated recommended schools were used as a control group instead of all the applicants. Focusing again for comparison on the 1997 results suggests that the use of the recommended schools as a comparison group leads to higher treatment effects on some of the outcomes: 2.266 versus 1.066 for credit units, 5.338 versus 2.897 for average score, and 0.027 versus -0.001 for the proportion of pupils who earned the matriculation certificate. On the other hand, the two samples lead to practically the same estimated 1311 effect on each of the other two outcomes (science credit units and the proportion of students taking the matriculation exams). Table 7 presents estimation models that included interaction of the treatment variable with the student demographic variables. In all cases the interaction terms of treatment effect with parental schooling are negative, but in most cases they are not significantly different from zero. However, the interaction with family size is negative also, and in most cases it is large and significantly different from zero. The negative sign of this variable indicates that the treatment effect is larger for students who come from small families, a status highly correlated with high income and with high educational achievement measures. This result suggests that the resources program, unlike the teachers' incentive program, had most of its effect on the better students, those who are above average in their performance measures.
The resources program had no effect on dropout rates.17 This result is in sharp contrast to the evidence presented above about the effect of the teachers' incentive program on the dropout rate.
VI. The Relative Cost Effectiveness of the Two Interventions
The appropriate cost-benefit comparison should be based on a set of schools that experienced both interventions (incentives and resources), but this condition is not fulfilled in our case. However, a meaningful comparison is still feasible if these schools are very similar in preprogram characteristics. A comparison between the schools included in the two programs reveals that both groups are very similar in pretreatment achievement measures and characteristics. Comparing column 1 in table 1 with that in table 5 points to striking similarities, which are purely coincidental. This close resemblance makes the comparison of the two interventions meaningful, in the sense that the estimate of the difference between the two programs in cost effectiveness is very likely to be unbiased.
The relevant comparison between these two options is the one based on cost equivalence. The total cost of the teachers' incentives program in 1996 was higher: $1.44 million annually versus $1.13 million annually for the school resources program. However, the incentives program affected almost three times the number of schools as the resources program (62 vs. 22 schools). Therefore, the cost per school of the resources program ($51,600) was more than double the average cost per school of the incentives program ($23,300). To determine which of the two programs was more efficient, the gap in the cost per school should 17 Detailed results are available in Lavy (1999). 0.021). All these differences are significantly different from zero at conventional levels of statistical significance, except in the case of the average score. However, the incentives program had a significant effect on the number of science credit units, the proportion of pupils who earned matriculation certificates, and the dropout rate; no effect on these outcomes is estimated for the resources intervention.
Our results indicate that the resources program had, on average, a (50-70 percent) higher effect on three outcomes than the incentives program, but it had a lower effect on three other outcomes and it cost more than twice as much. Therefore, per marginal dollar spent, the teachers' incentive intervention seems to be much more cost effective.l8
The cost-benefit analysis discussed above is valid under the assumption that the technology linking the interventions to output is not the same for the two programs. If the same function, relating allocated money to outcome, could describe the two programs, then the analysis above would be valid only under the assumption of constant returns to scale. When there are decreasing returns to money allocated to schools, then the observed pattern is possible even in the case in which money allocated to incentives and resources is a perfect substitute. In this case a more expensive program will have a lower outcome per dollar spent, regardless of whether it is an incentives or resources program. However, the assumption that the technology relating money to outcome is different for the two programs seems more realistic in this case. Several other aspects of the two programs should also be relevant for The boost received by schools through the resources program amounted to a significant increase in total school teaching resources (on average, more than two teachers per school), or about 1.3 percent of the average number of teaching staff in the treated schools. On the other hand, the salary bonuses awarded to teachers were very small relative to their annual income: the highest bonus per teacher was $715 and the lowest $200. Since average gross annual income of teachers is $30,000, the maximum bonus is about 2.5 percent of annual income and the lowest bonus is less than 1 percent of annual income. However, the nonmonetary benefit from the publicity and resulting improved reputation of winning schools cannot be overlooked in this comparison.
VII. Summary and Conclusions
The idea of developing stronger performance incentives directly focused on students' achievements has vast appeal and is the subject of frequent discussion. But incentives have seldom been tried in practice, and experiments with them are even more limited. Studies and analyses of the few available examples lack many of the details crucial to judging their more general applicability. In this paper I present an evaluation of the effect on students' achievements of schools' and teachers' performancebased incentives programs implemented in Israel in a large number of schools. The program had the main elements of a rank-order tournament, where only the top one-third performers were awarded monetary bonuses. The rules of selection of schools for the program present an opportunity to base the identification strategy on a natural experiment. The results suggest that the schools' performance incentives led to significant gains in all five achievement measures of high school graduates, including average test scores and the number of science and other credit units, and in the dropout rate from ninth to tenth grade. The program led to an increase in the proportion of students, especially among those from a disadvantaged background, who qualified for a matriculation certificate. These results were obtained for both parts of the Jewish school system, religious and secular. Since the program was implemented at schools in relatively small communities, we should be cautious in extrapolating the results to other environments. An alternative to the program based on incentives-more school resources, in the form of teaching time and a focus on potential dropouts and weak students-also had a significant effect on students' achievements. This result should come as no surprise since this program, too, encouraged the creativity and effort needed to develop and implement effective interventions. This was done by giving schools complete control over the additional resources and total freedom to shape its elements.
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This is a feature common to both programs, and perhaps it is effective. However, a comparison based on cost equivalency indicates that the teachers' performance-based incentives program is more efficient.
The schools' and teachers' incentives program studied in this paper is only one of many possible variations. Little is known about what forms of incentive systems are best in general or specific circumstances, or about precisely what results might be expected from making wider use of any specific system. However, the importance of the evaluation presented here lies in the fact that the power of incentives observed elsewhere in the economy is also evident in schools, even in the case of relatively low performance bonuses.'9 There are some open issues that could not be addressed in this paper, for example, what the relative efficacy of group versus individual incentives is, whether the improvements are permanent, and what would happen if the incentives were removed. Finding the answers to these questions and the best ways to structure incentives in schools, for teachers and students alike, should be based on more experimentation and evaluation.
